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This paper analyses crucial design features of unemployment insurance (UI) policies. We 
examine three different means of improving the efficiency of UI: the duration of benefit 
payments, monitoring in conjunction with sanctions, and workfare. To that end we develop a 
quantitative model of equilibrium unemployment. The model features worker heterogeneity, 
which takes the form of differences in preferences for leisure. All the instruments are ways of 
limiting the duration of UI benefit receipt and the model can be used to compare them in a 
coherent fashion. The analysis suggests that a system with monitoring and sanctions restores 
search incentives most effectively, since it brings additional incentives to search actively so as 
to avoid the sanction. Therefore, the UI provider can offer a more generous UI replacement 
rate in a system with monitoring and sanctions than in the other two systems. Workfare 
appears to be inferior to the other two systems.  
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1. Introduction 
Theoretical modeling of unemployment insurance (UI) has typically focused on the benefit 
level or the replacement rate, i.e., the fraction of earnings replaced by unemployment benefits. 
Of course, the design of an optimal UI system raises many other issues. For example, should 
there be a time limit on benefit receipt? To what extent should benefit recipients be induced to 
follow prescribed search requirements? Is there a case for a work requirement in exchange for 
benefits?  
The present paper contributes to the welfare analysis of UI by analyzing three different 
means of improving the efficiency of UI. The first instrument is the duration of benefit 
payments, or more generally the time sequencing of benefits; the second is monitoring in 
conjunction with sanctions; and the third is workfare. The purpose is to offer a framework that 
allows a comparison of the three instruments in a coherent fashion. Needless to say, an 
exhaustive discussion of UI design should also consider other issues, such as modes of 
financing and entitlement rules, issues that are ignored in the present paper.  
The question of time sequencing of benefits is about whether benefits should be paid at a 
fixed rate over the spell of unemployment or decline (or increase) over the spell. This issue 
appeared in the literature on optimal UI in the late 1970s and has attracted new attention in 
recent research.
1 Issues regarding monitoring and sanctions concern how much resources 
should be spent on checking search behavior and how sanctions, such as benefit cuts, should 
be implemented if prescribed search requirements are not met. These questions have been 
discussed in policy circles but only rarely been the subject of research.
2 
Workfare – the requirement that a benefit recipient participate in some work activity in 
exchange for benefits – has been on the policy agenda for a very long time; indeed, examples 
of workfare in France and Britain can be traced centuries back (Besley and Coate, 1992). 
                                                 
1 Shavell and Weiss (1979) is the seminal paper in this area. More recent studies include Hopenhayn and 
Nicolini (1997), Wang and Wiliamson (1996), Davidson and Woodbury (1997), Cahuc and Lehmann (2000) and 
Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001).  
2 Recent theoretical papers include Boone and van Ours (2000) and Boone et al. (2002). A growing number of 
empirical studies suggest that monitoring in conjunction with sanctions can have substantial behavioral effects. 
See Abbring et al. (1998), van den Berg et al. (1998) and Lalive et al. (2002) for evidence on the effects of 
sanctions. Several randomized experiments from the United States indicate that more stringent search 
requirements reduce the duration of benefit receipt (Johnson and Kleppinger, 1994; Benus and Johnson, 1997).   2
Workfare has been scrutinized in the public finance literature on poverty alleviation (Besley 
and Coate 1992, 1995). In the context of UI, workfare has sometimes been discussed in 
conjunction with active labor market policies (Jackman, 1994). One idea in this discussion is 
that labor market programs can be useful to implement the work test of UI. Although the idea 
has been around for some time, it has not been subject to much rigorous formal analysis.
3  
In this paper we formulate a quantitative model of equilibrium unemployment within 
which each of the three policy instruments can be examined. The model extends the analyses 
of Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001), Boone and van Ours (2000), and Boone et al. (2002) by 
incorporating worker heterogeneity and by enlarging the set of policy instruments. Worker 
heterogeneity appears as differences in preferences for leisure. The motivation for this 
approach is the desire to shed light on the role of workfare as a screening device. When 
workers differ in their preferences for leisure, they will also differ with respect to their search 
effort. However, search effort is unobserved by the insurer – or at least observed imperfectly – 
and UI benefits can therefore not be directly conditioned on search. If search indeed were 
observed one would expect that an optimal UI policy would reward active and penalize less 
active search. Workfare schemes may conceivably be useful as a means to encourage UI 
beneficiaries to engage in active job search. To our knowledge, no earlier study has 
systematically explored the performance of workfare in comparison to other conceivable 
policy instruments. 
The next section presents the basic theoretical framework and Section 3 turns to the 
welfare analysis. This analysis suggests that a system with monitoring and sanctions restores 
search incentives most effectively, since it brings additional incentives to search actively so as 
to avoid the sanction. Therefore, the UI provider can offer a more generous UI replacement 
rate in a system with monitoring and sanctions than in the other two systems. Workfare 
appears to be inferior to the other two systems. 
 
                                                 
3 The recent paper by Hansen and Tranæs (1999) is an exception. Several empirical studies have found support 
for the idea that workfare works as a screening device. The study by Black et al. (2003) indicates that the mere 
threat of being placed in a labor market program can reduce time spent on UI and boost job findings. The results 
reported by Benus and Kleppinger (1997) point in the same direction. Fredriksson and Holmlund (2003) offer a 
survey of recent literature on how to improve incentives in UI.   3
2. The Model  
The model extends the analysis in Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001) by incorporating 
individual heterogeneity. We consider heterogeneity in preferences for leisure, i.e. the same 
form of heterogeneity as Beaudry and Blackorby (1998) and Hansen and Tranæs (1999). 
 
2.1 Workers and Labor Market Transitions 
We follow Hansen and Tranæs (1999) in assuming that there are only two types of 
individuals:  workers (w) and non-workers (n). For an individual of type  n w i , = , 







i c A ln ln δ υ + =  (1) 
 
where c denotes consumption and A leisure. The marginal rate of substitution between 
consumption and leisure differs between workers and non-workers. In particular we assume 
that  n w δ δ < . This difference in turn implies different levels of consumption and leisure for 
workers and non-workers. We will make the extreme assumption that non-workers do not 
search for a job unless the monetary compensation outside employment becomes 
unreasonably low. 
There are four potential states (j): employment (e), unemployment insurance (UI) receipt 
(u), participation in workfare (p), or unemployment assistance (UA) receipt (a). Associated 
with each state is a present discounted value, 
j
i V ,  a p u e j , , , = . 
To preserve tractability we assume that consumption equals income in each instant, i.e., 
individuals cannot save or borrow. A representative employed worker thus consumes income 
from work,  w c
e
i = , and enjoys a fixed amount of leisure,  A A = e
i .
4 An individual on UI 
consumes  bw cu
i = , where w is the aggregate wage, and enjoys leisure of  u
i
u
i s − =1 A  (the time 
constraint has been normalized to unity). An individual on workfare consumes  bw c
p





i s p− − =1 A  of leisure; the tasks required in workfare “taxes” away p units of 
leisure time. Finally, an individual on unemployment assistance consumes  zw c
a
i =  of goods 
                                                 
4 We refer to w as the wage although it is in fact wage income, i.e., the wage rate times hours of work. If workers 
choose their working time, taking the hourly wage as given, work-hours – and thus leisure – during employment 
will be independent of the wage. In particular, leisure will be given by  /(1 ) e




i s − =1 A  units of leisure. We take compensation on UI and workfare to be greater than 
unemployment assistance (UA), i.e.,  z b ≥ . 
An employed worker is separated from his job at an exogenous Poisson rate, φ . A spell of 
employment immediately qualifies for UI benefits. The job offer arrival rate for individuals 
outside employment depends on search intensity and the aggregate state of the market. For 
individuals in state  a p u k , , = , job offers arrive at the rate  α k
i s . The offer arrival rate 
conditional on search, α , is a market variable that we endogenize later on. Notice that non-
workers do not search and hence  0 = k
n s . Finally, UI recipients are transferred to UA or 
workfare at the rate  ) (
u
i s µπ . We interpret this transition rate below. 
Having defined the relevant transition rates and the compensation in each state we can 
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where r is the subjective rate of time preference. Equations (2)-(5) embody the assumptions 
that time is continuous and individuals have infinite horizons. 
The three institutions that we consider come out as special cases of equation (3). Consider 
first the system with time limits. A convenient way of parameterizing such a system is as 
follows: Write the stochastic termination rate as being independent of  u
i s , i.e.,  ( ) 1
u
i s π=  and 





w V V V = ) , max( , i.e., workers prefer UA over workfare. In this 
incarnation, the model features stochastic duration of benefit receipt; the expected duration of 
unemployment insurance receipt is thus (1 µ). Using this modeling strategy we avoid the 
non-stationarities associated with fixed duration that complicates the model without adding 
much insight; see Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001). 
Consider next the system with monitoring and sanctions. Recipients of UI benefits are 
monitored with respect to their search behavior at the Poisson rate µ. Monitoring is a random 
inspection of an individual’s search activity. Given monitoring, there is some probability that   5
the observed search effort does not meet the search requirement, in which case the worker is 
sanctioned and transferred to state a. Thus,  ( )
u
i s π  is the probability of being sanctioned per 
unit time given that the individual is monitored and supplies 
u
i s  units of search. In sum, the 
system with monitoring and sanctions is parameterized as follows: the termination rate of UI 
benefit receipt is a decreasing function of search,  () 0
uu






w V V V = ) , max( . 
For practical purposes, we choose  ( ) 1
uu
ii ss π= − σ  as our parameterization of the 
sanctioning probability. To ensure that π  is a proper probability, we take σ  to be bounded by 
the unit interval, that is, 01 ≤σ≤ . This restriction implies that there is a positive probability 
of being sanctioned for all values of 
u
i s . In other words the monitoring technology is plagued 
by Type II errors – some complying individuals are sanctioned. The parameter σ  measures to 
which extent the sanction probability depends on an agent's own search effort. One way to 
interpret σ  is that it indexes the precision of the inspection technology. A simple example may 
illustrate why it is useful to think of σ  as an indicator of the precision of the inspection 
technology. Consider the extreme case when  0 σ= . This case mirrors the situation where 
benefit administrators roll a dice to determine whether the monitored individual has searched 
to rule or not. The inspection technology is thus completely random from the job searcher’s 
perspective. In this case, the monitoring and sanctions system is equivalent to our incarnation 
of a system with finite duration of UI benefit receipt. We can therefore meaningfully compare 
the two systems by changing one parameter. 
Consider finally a system with workfare. Individuals are randomly subjected to a work test 
at rate µ. Given an offer to participate in workfare, they choose  ) , max( a
i
p
i V V . For a workfare 










n V V V = ) , max( . That 
is, the time requirement should be set such that workers opt for workfare while non-workers 
prefer unemployment assistance. Thus a workfare system is defined by  ( ) 1
u
i s π=  and the self-
selection constraints  a
w
p
w V V >  and  a
n
p
n V V ≤ . 
Workers determine search in an atomistic fashion, i.e., by taking all wages and the offer 
arrival rate conditional on search, α , as given. In general, optimal search for individuals on UI 
satisfies    6












The left-hand-side of (6) represents the marginal cost of search, that is, the marginal utility of 
leisure, while the right-hand-side constitutes the marginal return to search. The marginal 
return has two components: the first term refers to an increase in the job offer arrival rate and 
the second term to a reduction in the transition rate to UA. The systems with a time limit and 
workfare have  0 σ= , so the second component never appears in the marginal return to search. 














Non-workers do not search at all so for them it must be true that  n δ  is strictly greater than the 
marginal return to search in each state.  
We restrict attention to a steady state environment. For workers there are flow equilibrium 
constraints that define the rates of employment and unemployment in the working population. 
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where ) (⋅ I  is the indicator function ( 1 ) ( = ⋅ I  if the expression within parenthesis is true) and 
j




w e u − = λ .  
 
2.2 Matching and Wage Determination 
The equilibrium in the model has an endogenous wage (w) and an endogenous offer arrival 
rate conditional on search (α ). We endogenize w and α  by specifying a matching technology 
and a wage bargaining model. With respect to the matching technology we make the standard 
assumptions that the matching function  ) , ( v s h h w =  is of the constant returns to scale variety 
and is increasing in both arguments. The “inputs” to the production of matches are the   7



















w w u s V V I u s V V I u s s ) ( ) ( ≤ + > + =  and the 
number of vacancies (v). The probability of finding a job conditional on search is then 
() ( ,) ( 1 ,) w w hs v s h αθ= = θ , where  () w vs θ≡  is a measure of labor market tightness. Firms 
fill vacancies at the rate  () ( ,) ( 1 , 1 ) w qh s v v h θ= = θ . It is straightforward to verify that 
0 ) ( > θ α ′  and  ( ) 0 q′ θ< , i.e. the tighter the market the easier it is for workers to find jobs and 
the more difficult it is for firms to find workers.  
Wages are determined in individual bargaining between the worker and the firm. To 
determine the outcome of the wage bargain we must also specify firm values. The government 
finances unemployment expenditure by a proportional payroll tax (τ ) levied on firms. Labor 
productivity is constant and given by y. The cost of holding a vacancy open is  y κ , with 
0 > κ . The value functions take the usual form 
 
 () ( )
ve v rJ y q J J =−κ + θ −  (9) 
 (1 ) ( )
ee v rJ y w J J =− + τ − φ −  (10) 
 
where 
v J  is the asset value of a vacant job and 
e J  the asset value of an occupied job. Since 
there is no cost of entering and exiting the vacancy market, a free entry condition,  0 =
v J , 
determines the number of vacancies in the market. From the free entry condition we obtain 
the wage cost,  ) 1 ( τ + ≡ w wc , as proportional to the marginal product of labor: 
[1 ( )( ( ))] ( ) c wrq y d y =−+ φ κθ ≡θ . We refer to  ( ) c wdy =θ  as the zero-profit condition. It 
specifies a negative relationship between  c w  and θ , ( ) 0 d′ θ< , since wage costs have to be 
lower in a tighter market in order to be consistent with zero profits.  
Now consider wage determination. Given that bargaining is conducted at the individual 
level, the wage is given by 
1 argmax[ ( ) ] [ ( ) ] , (0,1)
eu ev
ww wV w V J w J
β− β =− − β ∈ . Imposing 
symmetry and the equilibrium condition,  0 =
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The model has a convenient recursive structure where the zero-profit condition and equation 
(11) determine θ  and  c w . To see this, note that free entry of vacancies implies  / ( )
e Jy q =κ θ . 
The right-hand side of (11) is thus increasing in θ  but independent of 
j
w s . The left-hand side 
of (11) is also a function of θ . But it is independent of w, given our chosen utility function 
and constant replacement rates. Moreover, it can be shown that it is independent of 
j
w s  when 
the first-order condition for optimal search is invoked. With tightness determined, we get 
j
w s  
from (6) and (7), recognizing that the wage does not affect the differences in present values. 
With θ  and 
j
w s  determined, we get unemployment and employment rates from the flow 




We are interested in Pareto optimal UI policies. The objective of the UI provider is to 
maximize the expected utility of workers subject to non-workers receiving at least a minimum 
amount of utility. Thus, the welfare objective is  
 
 ()()
eu u p a p p p a a a
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This is the relevant objective if there is no discounting because then firm values are irrelevant. 
We ignore discounting in order to validly compare alternative steady states without 
considering the adjustment process.  
The final piece of the model is the government budget constraint. In general, it takes the 
form 
 
 [( ) ( )( ) ] ( 1 )
up a p p a
ww w w w w w e b w u C IV V b w u IV V z w z w γτ = γ + ⋅ + > + ≤ + −γ  (14) 
 
where γ  is the worker share of the population. The left-hand-side of (14) represents the 
revenues from the payroll tax. The right-hand-side constitutes unemployment expenditure. 
The first component, in square brackets, refers to unemployment expenditure in relation to the   9
worker population and the second component is compensation paid to non-workers.  ) (⋅ C , the 
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where ( ) 0 c σ≥ , '( ) 0 c σ>  and  0 ) 0 ( = c , is the marginal cost of monitoring. Costs are 
increasing in the number of monitored individuals; the sanction itself commands no resources. 
As argued above, σ  can be interpreted as indexing the precision of the inspection technology. 
We take the marginal cost of monitoring to be increasing in σ ; thus a more precise technology 
requires greater effort on the part of those who monitor search behavior.  
Before proceeding to the numerical results let us ask the question: Is worker search 
behavior optimal from society’s point of view? The answer is that, as long as it is optimal to 
provide some insurance to the unemployed, search intensity will be too low in equilibrium. 
The reason is that there is a tax base effect of increasing search. If all individuals supplied 
additional search, employment would increase and, consequently, the tax that finances a given 
unemployment insurance system would be lower. Everyone would gain from a lower tax rate 
since the consumption wage would be higher. This effect is not taken into account in the 
private determination of search; see Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001) for details. Indeed this 
is the rationale for introducing two of the policy instruments that we consider below.  
 
2.4 Calibration of the Model 
We take a quarter as the basic time unit and calibrate the model for a uniform benefit system, 
i.e., one that has  z b = . We set the uniform wage replacement rate to 30 percent, which 
approximately corresponds to uniform characterization of the US unemployment benefit 
system; see Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001). The marginal product of labor is normalized to 
unity. The matching function is of the Cobb-Douglas variety: 
1
w ha s v
η −η = . We set  28 . 1 = a  
and 0.5 η= ; the latter is at the upper end of the estimates in Blanchard and Diamond (1989). 
We set the bargaining parameter to β =η , which is the optimal value if there would be no 
policy interventions; see Hosios (1990).   10
The remaining parameters, κ , φ , and  w δ , are calibrated with respect to the working 
population. The calibration is such that the unemployment rate is 6.5 percent, unemployment 
duration is one quarter, and the partial equilibrium elasticity of the hazard to employment with 
respect to benefits equals 0.5. These calibration points are broadly in line with the recent US 
experience.  
We also need to assign some values for the number of workers (γ ) and  n δ . We think of the 
potential labor force as consisting of two groups of individuals. A fraction γ  has a relatively 
low preference for leisure and therefore finds it worthwhile to search when out of work. 
Workers in this category constitute the “effective” labor force. The remaining fraction has a 
high preference for leisure and does not search. Somewhat arbitrarily, we assume that the 
ratio between the effective and the potential labor force is 0.95.
5 To assign a value  n δ  we 
assumed that non-workers would be willing to search only if  1 . 0 ≤ = z b . The exact value of 
n δ  is only relevant when designing a system with workfare.  
To calculate the numbers for the monitoring and sanctions system we need an estimate of 
) (σ c  in (15). We used Swedish data and performed the following calculation to get a 
reasonable number for this parameter. In Sweden, the employment offices monitor job search. 
Job counselors devote around 30 percent of their time to meetings with job searchers; see 
Lundin (2000). The number of employees at the employment offices is approximately equal 
to 0.25 percent of the labor force. Therefore, we took  00075 . 0 0025 . 0 3 . 0 = ×  as an estimate of 
the real resource cost of the monitoring and sanctions system relative to GDP. Thus  ( )
u
w cu σ µ  
should equal 0.00075. According to Lundin (2000), public employment service officers on 
average have close to two meetings with an unemployed per quarter. If we set  2 µ=  and 
05 . 0 =
u
w u , this implies that  ( ) 0.0075 c σ≈ . To proceed we must specify the marginal cost 
function. We take a simple linear cost function  ψ σ = σ ) ( c  and use  02 0. = ψ  when we 
calculate the numbers for the monitoring and sanctions system. It seems to us that this is a 
fairly large value for the marginal cost of monitoring. Still we prefer a “conservative” number 
                                                 
5 Existing labor force surveys include various measures of “disguised” unemployment. One category, referred to 
as “latent job seekers” in Sweden, consists of non-participants reporting to be willing and able to work although 
they do not fulfill the search criteria for being classified as unemployed. Over the period 1995-2002, the ratio 
between the official and the potential labor force (the latter including latent job seekers) was 0.96 in Sweden.   11
since there is genuine uncertainty about the value of this parameter. Table 1 summarizes the 
baseline parameters and Table 2 shows some key outcomes in the baseline calibration with a 
uniform benefit system. 
 
Table 1: Baseline parameters 
Description Parameter 
Matching technology: 
1 ha s v
η− η =   282335 . 1 = a  
 0.5 η =  
Distribution of individuals and leisure values:   0.95 γ =  
 0.776489 w δ=  
 2.646591 n δ=  
Marginal product of labor   1 = y  
Vacancy cost  1.111860 κ=  
Separation rate  0.069519 φ =  
Share parameter in the wage bargain  0.5 β =  
Marginal cost of monitoring:  ψ σ = σ ) ( c  02 0. = ψ  
 
3. A Comparison of the Three Policy Instruments 
3.1 The Uniform Benefit System 
The baseline calibration features an unemployment rate among workers (
u
w u ) of 6.5 percent 
and unemployed individuals spend 61 percent of their time searching for a job; see 
u
w s . Wages 
(net of taxes) are lower than the marginal product of labor because of search frictions. In the 
baseline calibration, the wage (w) amounts to 89 percent of the marginal product of labor. 
How does search respond to changes in the UI replacement rate? Since an increase in the 
replacement rate decreases the gain of finding employment, individuals respond by searching 
less when UI becomes more generous. As we shall see later, however, this is not necessarily 
true when we consider more general UI systems than the one paying a constant wage 
replacement rate indefinitely.  
   12
 






Optimal system with time limits 
Policy variables    
b  0.3 0.4621 
z   -- 0.3016 
µ  -- 0.5 
τ   0.0377 0.0538 
Economic outcomes    
u
w s   0.6081 0.4880 
a
w s   -- 0.6099 
u
w u   0.0650 0.0529 
a
w u   -- 0.0300 
w  0.8891 0.8844 
ε   -- 0.55  % 
Notes: Superindex u and a refer to UI and UA respectively. Remaining symbols in the table are explained in the 
main text. In the system with time limits µ is fixed at 0.5. The change in welfare is measured relative to the base 
run.  
 
We consider Pareto optimal benefit policies and assume that the UI provider maximizes 
the expected utility of workers subject to the constraint that non-workers receive at least a 
minimum amount of utility. The UI provider knows the distribution of workers and non-
workers in the population but it cannot tell if an individual is a worker or a non-worker. In 
addition to providing insurance, an optimally designed UI system should ideally screen out 
non-workers and increase the search intensity among workers.  
Suppose that the base run defines the minimum utility of non-workers, i.e., 
ln 0.3 0.8891
u
n zw υ= = × ; see column 1 in Table 1. Can we design an optimal uniform benefit 
system that is different from the base run? The answer to this question is no. The reason is 
that with only the wage replacement rate as an instrument it is impossible to separate the two 
types. The wage replacement rate is tied down to 30 percent because of the minimum utility 
constraint.  
 
   13
3.2 Time Limits in Benefit Receipt 
Consider now the case with time limits on UI benefit receipt. The search intensity among 
workers depends on whether she is insured or non-insured (i.e. on UA). If  z b ≥ , it is 




w s s ≤ , that is, a worker searches less intensively when 
receiving UI (indexed by u) compared to UA (indexed by a). The intuition is simply that 
search intensity while receiving UI is lower because there is a smaller gain associated with 
finding employment.  
What happens to search in each state when we change the replacement rates? With respect 
to z the model works much the same as before: search intensity is falling in the generosity of 
unemployment assistance. However, there is a differential effect of the UI replacement rate. 
An increase in b reduces the search intensity of the insured, but increases the search intensity 
of the non-insured. The latter effect is the entitlement effect, first highlighted by Mortensen 
(1977). Those on UA search harder when UI becomes more generous since employment is a 
prerequisite for receiving UI. Since there is a tax base effect associated with search, an 
optimal benefit system exploits the entitlement effect by introducing finite duration of UI 
receipt (see Fredriksson and Holmlund, 2001).  
We now conduct the following experiment. The expected duration of UI benefit receipt is 
fixed to six months, which implies  0.5 µ= . An expected duration of six months corresponds 
to the duration of UI receipt in the US. Then we solve for the optimal benefit system by 
choosing b and z such that the expected utility among workers is maximized subject to the 
minimum utility constraint for non-workers, the budget constraint, and the market equilibrium 
constraints.  
In Figure 1 we plot welfare for workers at different values of the relative reduction in the 
monetary compensation when UI expires,  b z b / ) ( − . If there is no reduction in the monetary 
compensation, the model is formally equivalent to a uniform benefit system as there is no 
penalty associated with losing the entitlement to UI. However, as shown in the figure, such a 
system is not optimal. An optimal system implies that benefits should be reduced by 35 
percent when UI expires.  
   14
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In column 2 of Table 2 we present the implications of the optimal system with time limits. 
The optimal system with time limits gives workers substantially more insurance than the base 
run. The UI replacement rate amounts to 46 percent of the wage. Since compensation is more 





w u u + and taxes increase.  
As a measure of the change in welfare implied by a move to the optimal system we 
consider the consumption tax (ε ) that would make workers indifferent between living in the 
optimal system and the base run.
6 As shown by the last row in Table 1, they would be willing 
to pay 0.55 percent of consumption to live in the optimal system with time limits.  
 
 
                                                 
6 The consumption tax is equivalent to the change in welfare. To illustrate this, consider two candidate policies 0 
and 1. Let  1 ˆ () W ε  denote welfare after the imposition of the consumption tax and  0 W  denote welfare without the 
tax. The consumption tax that makes workers indifferent between the two systems is defined by the solution to 
0 1 ) ( ˆ W W = ε . Because of our utility function, ε  solves  0 1 ) 1 ln( W W = ε − + . If ε  is small, we have  ε − ≈ ε − ) 1 ln(  
and therefore 0 1 W W − ≈ ε .   15
3.3 Monitoring and Sanctions 
In this section we make the following policy experiment. Again we fix µ to 0.5 such that 
unemployed workers on average are monitored every second quarter. Then we choose b, z, 
and σ  optimally in the same way as we did above.  
There are two behavioral implications of introducing a system with monitoring and 
sanctions. First of all, for given wage replacement rates, UI recipients will search harder since 
an increase in search reduces the risk of being sanctioned and transferred to UA receipt. 
Second, workers will bargain more aggressively. This is because there will be a reduction in 
the transition rate to UA receipt given search intensity. In the system with time limits, the 
transition rate is µ; in the monitoring and sanctions system it is  (1 )
u
w s µ− σ . The reduction of 
the transition rate to the least favored state yields an improvement of workers’ outside 
opportunities. Therefore, workers bargain more aggressively – wage costs increase and fewer 
jobs are created. All in all, the policy experiment thus has two opposing effects on 
employment – search increases but at the same time wage pressure rises – and the 
employment effect of the policy is a priori ambiguous.  
Figure 2 presents an analogous graph as Figure 1. It plots the expected utility of workers 
for different values of the relative monetary sanction,  b z b / ) ( − , when being transferred to 
UA. The graph is derived holding σ  constant at its optimal value. We plot the graph as long as 
welfare is higher than in the base run. We see that there is an interior solution featuring 
monitoring and sanctions. Also by comparing the welfare scales of Figures 1 and 2 we see 
that a system with monitoring and sanctions delivers higher expected utility for workers than 
the system with time limits.  
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In column 2 of Table 3 we report a set of outcomes pertaining to the system with 
monitoring and sanctions. For ease of comparison we give the outcomes with time limits in 
column 1. The outcome of this policy experiment is that the UI provider should always opt for 
a precise technology, i.e.,  1 σ= . Presumably, this result is driven by the assumed cost 
structure. Therefore, we are reluctant to place a lot of emphasis on the exact value for σ . 
Nevertheless, in Boone et al. (2002) we conclude that the introduction of a system with 
monitoring and sanction is a welfare improvement relative to a system with time limits for 
reasonable values of monitoring costs. These costs would have to be implausibly high in order 
for this conclusion not to hold. So we are reasonably comfortable in the conclusion suggested 
by the last line of Table 2, i.e., that workers would be willing to pay more to live in the an 
optimal system with monitoring and sanctions than in a system with time limits.  
With monitoring and sanctions, the UI provider can afford to be more generous to UI 
recipients. The UI replacement rate equals 50 percent in a system with monitoring and 
sanctions; the corresponding number with time limits is 46 percent. Despite the fact that   17
search intensity increases, unemployment increases with monitoring and sanctions. This has 
to do with the adverse effect on wage setting induced by an improvement in workers’ outside 
option. Workers’ outside options increase both because the UI replacement rate is higher but 
also because the introduction of monitoring and sanctions improves workers bargaining 
position. Since wage costs increase firms respond by creating fewer vacancies. 
  






Monitoring and sanctions 
Policy variables    
B  0.4621 0.5045 
Z  0.3016 0.3027 
µ  0.5 0.5 
σ  0 1 
τ  0.0538 0.0635 
Economic outcomes    
u
w s   0.4880 0.5000 
a
w s   0.6099 0.6106 
u
w u   0.0529 0.0689 
a
w u   0.0300 0.0211 
W  0.8844 0.8812 
ε   0.55 %  0.78 % 
Notes: Superindex u and a refer to UI and UA respectively. Remaining symbols are explained in the main text. 




Consider, finally, how the system works with workfare. We think of a world where 
employment officers administer a “work test” randomly at rate µ. If the unemployed worker 
enters workfare she is required to perform some duties (p) that reduce the time available for 
other activities; hence, leisure while participating in workfare is given by  1
pp
ww p s =− − A . In 
exchange for these duties she gets to keep the UI benefit.  
As noted by Hansen and Tranæs (1999), workfare is potentially a welfare improving 
screening device. Consider a benefit system that is uniform initially, i.e., bz = . Since 
preferences for leisure are private information to the individuals, both workers and non-  18
workers will claim and receive benefits. Imagine now that workfare is introduced as a 
requirement for benefit receipt along with a slight increase in UI while keeping UA fixed. The 
welfare of non-workers is not affected as long as they avoid workfare and prefer not to search. 
The welfare of workers may well increase since they care less about the reduction in leisure 
associated with workfare. 
Appropriately designed workfare must satisfy two self-selection constraints. If workfare 
acts as a screen, it should not be optimal for workers and non-workers to mimic each other. 




w V V ≥  




n V V ≥ . If it is optimal for workers to opt for UA rather than workfare, then the model is 
formally equivalent to the system with time limits. So the defining constraint on a system with 
workfare is that it must not be optimal for non-workers to mimic workers.  
If non-workers mimic workers, then it will never be optimal to require workfare. The 
reason is that in this case workfare fulfils no screening function, it only imposes costs on 
workers and non-workers. Since the time requirement in workfare (p) imposes costs on 
workers, the Pareto optimal policy featuring workfare will be such that the incentive 




n V V = .  
If there is an equilibrium with workfare, then no worker will ever be transferred to 
unemployment assistance. Only non-workers will end up on UA. In this sense workfare is the 
perfect screening device. However, workfare is not conducive to search since there is a 
reduction in the available leisure time. Hence, it is not obvious that workfare will raise the 
expected utility of workers relative to the case with time limits. Moreover, the existence of a 
system with workfare depends crucially on whether the difference in terms of preferences for 
leisure is sufficiently large between workers and non-workers; see Hansen and Tranæs (1999). 
Thus it not clear that a system with workfare dominates a uniform benefit system, either. 
Now consider the following policy experiment. We fix µ to 0.5 implying that the 
unemployed are given an offer to participate in workfare once every second quarter. Then we 
choose b, z, and p optimally in the same fashion as above. The leisure value for non-workers   19
is calibrated so that they would search for a job if  1 . 0 ≤ b  in the uniform system. The ratio 
between the two leisure values is  / 3.4 nw δδ ≈ . 
Figure 3 graphs the expected utility of workers as a function of the time requirement in 
workfare (p). We plot the expected utility as long as it is greater than the expected utility in 
the base run. If  0 = p , workers get the same expected utility as in the base run. Given our 
assumption about  n δ , it turns out that there is an interior solution with workfare. However, 
the welfare scale suggests that workfare does not outperform time limits. 
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Column 2 of Table 4 reports a set of outcomes implied by an optimal system with 
workfare. Again, we give the corresponding outcomes with time limits in column 1 for ease of 
comparison. As shown in the table, the UI replacement rate is much lower with workfare than 
with time limits. This implies that search intensity on UI is higher than with time limits, 
despite the fact that workfare reduces the available time for other activities. The table also 
shows that the employment rate among workers is higher with workfare. Despite this workers   20
would rather live in an optimal system with time limits. The reason for this result is that there 
is too little insurance with workfare. 
 
3.5 Choosing m optimally 
All three experiments described above have treated m as fixed at 0.5. In the system with time 
limits, this corresponds to an expected duration of UI benefit receipt of two quarters; in the 
system with monitoring and sanctions, it means that insured workers are subjected to an 
inspection of search effort every second quarter; and in the system with workfare, m=0.5 
implies that workers on UI will experience a work test every second quarter. A natural 
question is whether our results are sensitive to the choice of m and whether there exists an 
optimal value of m. 
 







Policy variables    
B  0.4621 0.3546 
Z  0.3016 0.3010 
µ  0.5 0.5 
P  0 0.0591 
τ  0.0538 0.0457 
Economic outcomes    
u
w s   0.4880 0.5630 
a
w s   0.6099 -- 
p
w s   -- 0.5326 
u
w u   0.0529 0.0467 
a
w u  0.0300  -- 
p
w u   -- 0.0281 
W  0.8844 0.8862 
ε   0.55 %  0.12 % 
Notes: Superindex u, a and p refer to UI, UA and workfare respectively. Remaining symbols are explained in 
the main text. µ is fixed at 0.5. The welfare changes are measured relative to the base run.  
 
In Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001) we have shown that there exists on interior solution 
with (0, ) µ∈∞  in the system with time limits. Moreover, the analysis of monitoring and   21
sanctions in Boone et al (2002) involves choosing m optimally along with the other policy 
parameters. These features carry over to the present analysis, i.e., there exist interior solutions 
for m in both the time limits and the monitoring-cum-sanctions system.
7 However, it turns out 
that the optimal workfare system with m chosen optimally along with b and p entails a positive 
but infinitesimally small value of m. To understand this result, note that a rise in m means that 
workers receiving UI are transferred to a less favorable state at a higher rate, thus implying a 
first-order negative welfare effect. Other effects, such as the induced effects on tightness, may 
conceivably offset the first-order effect. In our simulation results, however, the potentially 
offsetting indirect effects are not sufficiently strong to offset the first-order effect. It thus 
follows that although m must be strictly positive, is should be set as small as possible. Of 
course, a workfare system requires m>0, otherwise no screening would take place. 
Figure 4 graphs the expected utility of workers as function of m over the range  ] , ( 2 0 ∈ µ . 
We consider four different systems, including the uniform one. Welfare is independent of m in 
the uniform system for the obvious reason that a change of state does not change replacement 
rates. 
The graph confirms our earlier reasoning. The UI systems featuring time limits and 
monitoring and sanctions have well defined interior solutions for µ. The numbers suggest that 
the expected duration of UI benefit receipt should be around a quarter in a system with time 
limits and that workers should be monitored 1.3 times every quarter in a system with 
monitoring and sanctions. In a UI system with workfare, however, µ should be set as low as 
possible (but it must be interior); for values of µ in the excess of 1.6, it is no longer possible to 
design a system with workfare that screens out non-workers and the system collapses to a 
uniform one. 
                                                 
7 This is of course unsurprising since the present model basically includes the previous ones as special cases.   22
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  Figure 4 also conveys the message that a system with workfare never outperforms a system 
with time limits; they only become equivalent for arbitrarily small values of µ because then 
workers are never transferred to the least favored state. The question is whether this is a 
general lesson. We think it is, at least in the setting we are examining. The rationale for this 
conclusion is the following. Consider the most potent case for workfare. This must be when it 
is very easy to deter non-workers from claiming UI benefits. Thus, if the leisure value of non-
workers is infinitely high, the time requirement that screens out non-workers from the system 
can be arbitrarily small. Then workers are not penalized by being subjected to a work test. In 
this extreme case, workfare enables the UI provider to design what is effectively a uniform 
benefit system that is optimal for workers. In Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001) we showed 
that a system with time limits always dominates the optimal uniform system. Therefore, we 
are reasonably confident is saying that workfare can never outperform time limits, given that 
the duties performed on workfare are unproductive. Of course, matters would be different if 
there was some valuable production going on while participating in workfare.     23
4. Discussion 
The three measures that we have considered are alternative ways of refraining non-workers 
from claiming UI benefits. With these instruments, the UI provider can offer more generous 
compensation to workers. Workers will, therefore, prefer a UI system featuring time limits, 
monitoring and sanctions, or workfare to a system paying a constant wage replacement rate 
indefinitely.  
The numerical analysis suggests a case for a monitoring and sanctions system. Since the 
system with monitoring and sanctions gives additional incentives to search, so as to avoid 
being transferred to UA, the UI provider can offer more insurance to the unemployed 
workers. One caveat to this conclusion may be that monitoring and sanctions raise the 
incentive to substitute formal search for informal search, as argued by van den Berg and van 
der Klaauw (2001). This is a complication that we have not considered in our numerical 
exercise. If informal and formal search are perfect substitutes then monitoring and sanctions 
will just be costly and bring no benefits in terms of restoring search incentives. Still it is 
difficult to believe that they are perfect substitutes; presumably there are some economies of 
scale of having search organized via the employment offices. 
Another caveat in the case for monitoring and sanctions is that the costs of the system are 
difficult to estimate. Nevertheless, in Boone et al. (2002) we showed that the costs of 
introducing monitoring and sanctions would have to be implausibly large in order to overturn 
the conclusion that monitoring and sanctions is a welfare improvement relative to time limits. 
The numerical results are less favorable to the case for workfare. Workfare is a perfect 
screening device, but it is not conducive to search. Therefore, the UI provider sets a lower UI 
replacement rate than in the systems with time limits and monitoring and sanctions. With 
preference heterogeneity as the only source of heterogeneity and unproductive workfare, we 
think that this conclusion applies fairly generally. 
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